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THE SEC RIDES INTO TOWN: DEFINING AN
ICO SECURITIES SAFE HARBOR IN THE
CRYPTOCURRENCY “WILD WEST”
C. Daniel Lockaby
This Note recommends a viable way for the Securities
and
Exchange
Commission (SEC) to apply
the
Regulation S foreign-issuer safe harbor to Initial Coin
Offerings (ICOs). In the last two years, cryptocurrencies
and blockchain-based companies have witnessed
dramatic rises in price and value. New entrants to the
crypto-markets often use ICOs as virtual public offerings
to earn capital and develop their projects.
The SEC has signaled that they plan to fold ICOs and
blockchain offerings into existing securities law. How
these new virtual capital-raising mechanisms will fit
into this framework is still largely unknown. As a
defensive measure, many ICOs have banned US
investors in an attempt to become foreign offerings that
are outside the SEC's reach. Regulation S is the existing
safe harbor that conventional securities offerings utilize
to ensure that they are "foreign offerings." While ICOs
are novel and do not fit perfectly into Regulation S's
language, the safe harbor can be adapted to
appropriately set parameters for ICOs. This Note
suggests the correct interpretation that both protects
US consumers and sets acceptable requirements for
corporations seeking to fall within Regulation S.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 4, 2017, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Chairman Jay Clayton sat in front of the House Financial
Services Committee to clarify the SEC’s agenda, operations, and
budget. Two hours into the hearing, Colorado Congressman Ed
Perlmutter expressed concerns of fraud in Initial Coin Offerings
(ICOs).1 He said that the new electronic offerings “remind[ed him]
of the old days with penny stocks.”2 Chairman Clayton then agreed
with Perlmutter’s characterization and added: “I’m cautiously
optimistic about the enforcement division’s approach to [Initial Coin
Offerings]. They know that this is a ripe area for pump-and-dump.
Pump-and-dump—it’s actually even easier here than it is in the
penny stock area because it’s all electronic, it’s all anonymous, it’s
harder to catch the bad guys at the end of the day.”3
Initial Coin Offerings are a new cryptocurrency-based
fundraising method, which tech companies use to generate capital.4
While ICOs vary in form, they are essentially initial public offerings
that raise capital from contributions on a blockchain (an electronic
distributed ledger), and the projects are almost universally geared
toward blockchain development.5
After their appearance in 2014, ICOs largely operated without
regulatory oversight. While startups raised money without
regulatory restrictions, suspicions developed that ICOs provided a
haven for empty investment schemes.6 Taking its first step into the
fray, the SEC published a report on a project called the
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) in July 2017.7 The
report ruled that the DAO’s ICO was an unregistered sale of

1 Examining the SEC’s Agenda, Operations, and Budget Before the H. Financial Servs.
Comm.,
115th
Cong.
(Oct.
4,
2017),
2:33:00–2:35:00,
https://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=402349.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 What is An Initial Coin Offering?, BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/initialcoin-offering/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
5 Id.
6 Oscar Williams-Grut, ‘Market Manipulation 101’: ‘Wolf of Wall Street’-style ‘pump and
dump’ scams plague cryptocurrency markets, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 14, 2017, 2:00 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/ico-cryptocurrency-pump-and-dump-telegram-2017-11
(describing scams in the crypto-market as “an open secret”).
7 SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N, DAO 21(A) REP., No. 81207 (July 25, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf.
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securities under the Securities Act of 1933, marking the first time
that the SEC labeled an ICO as a securities offering.8
The SEC requires companies offering securities to register their
offerings with the agency, a process that requires disclosure of
corporate financial condition and other relevant metrics.9 Following
the SEC’s ruling on the DAO, it was uncertain whether several
startup ICOs would similarly be subject to SEC Section 5 filing
requirements (companies issuing securities must either file
certifications and information with the SEC or fall within an
exemption) and face SEC enforcement. In response to this
uncertainty, tech businesses constricted their ICO breadth to
prohibit contributions from U.S. investors.10 By eliminating U.S.
contributions, the ICOs may avoid the SEC’s jurisdiction and forego
the filing requirements of the Securities Act.11
Securities offerings exclusively outside the U.S. have
traditionally sought exception to SEC registration requirements
under Regulation S of the Securities Act.12 ICOs too might seek this
safe harbor. However, the SEC’s expansion into ICO regulation is
so young that entrepreneurs and regulators alike are uncertain of
how blockchain projects will fit into the existing regulatory
infrastructure.
This Note argues that the Regulation S “safe harbor” can apply
to foreign ICOs without straining the Securities Act’s statutory
language.13 It also discusses the obligations that foreign ICO
projects must meet to mitigate SEC enforcement risk.14 Along with
those issues, this Note will outline practices that the SEC will likely
find insufficient for Regulation S compliance and discuss best
practices for ICO offerors conducting their ICOs outside the SEC’s
reach. 15 ICOs do not fit perfectly into Regulation S’s structure. ICOs
allow for anonymous investing, and they permit easy transfer across
Id. at 1.
See generally, Securities Act of 1933—Registration of securities, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2012).
10 Wendy McElroy, Some ICOs Now Ban Americans- Who Should Expect More Ostracism,
BITCOIN.COM (July 18, 2017), https://news.bitcoin.com/some-icos-now-ban-americans-whoshould-expect-more-ostracism/.
11 Id. (“‘[I]f I happen to create a service in the crypto world, I am sure to exclude USA
citizens because I don’t have money to pay lawyers and then [be] offered a deal to plead
guilty’ over an unforeseen or obscure requirement.”) (alterations in original).
12 SEC Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901–905 (2007).
13 See infra Part III.
14 See infra Part III.B.
15 See infra Part III.C.
8
9
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national borders. Still, the exemption can be adjusted to adequately
address crypto-markets without requiring an entirely new
exemption.
That said, this Note is confined to analyzing foreign ICO projects
seeking the Regulation S exemption under the Securities Act of
1933. It will not address obligations or liabilities for ICOs offerings
to U.S. investors. Nor will it discuss obligations or liabilities under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or individual state
requirements under Blue Sky laws. In that vein, this Note will also
avoid discussing liabilities for ICO fraud, though it will address
SEC actions involving fraud to demonstrate the agency’s current
stance. Finally, while this Note will consider crypto-token
exchanges to examine security flowback, it will not examine an
exchange’s obligations to comply with either the 1933 or the 1934
Acts.
In Part II, this Note provides background on blockchain
technology, cryptocurrencies, and ICOs. Part III addresses the
SEC’s ruling on the DAO and how ICOs responded by banning U.S.
investors. Part IV outlines a workable methodology for applying
Regulation S to Initial Coin Offerings and suggests best practices
for ICOs seeking filing exemptions as foreign offerors.
II. THE BRAVE NEW CRYPTO WORLD
A. WHAT IS BLOCKCHAIN?

Blockchain is the foundational technology upon which
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum were created.16 Also
known as “Distributed Ledger Technology,” blockchain is an
electronic version of a conventional ledger (think check books or
library records).17 Aside from being digital, the primary features
that make blockchain different and more desirable than a wellorganized filing cabinet are decentralization, immutability, and
(often) anonymity.18
Decentralization: Instead of relying on a centralized server to
store information, blockchain technology distributes an identical

Patrick Murck, Who Controls the Blockchain?, HARV. BUS. REV. (April 19, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/04/who-controls-the-blockchain.
17 Id.
18 Id.
16
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ledger to all connected computers (or nodes), creating a
decentralized storage system.19 Unlike conventional banks, there is
no central bookkeeper. All of the code in a public blockchain is
distributed amongst all users and blockchain maintenance
(recording and validating new transactions) is performed globally
using a process called mining.20 While a blockchain’s original
creators may fashion the code to maintain some control over the
system’s functions, new nodes in a public blockchain have the same
copy of the electronic ledger as the creators, and everyone is bound
by the code’s rules.21
Immutability: Put simply, it is very difficult to mess with a
blockchain’s recorded data. Blockchains can only be altered with
permission from multiple connected nodes.22 Immutability and
consensus help ensure that a single bad actor cannot alter the
ledger’s content. When a new transaction is verified by a set number
of nodes, it is encrypted and added to a block of other transactions.
The block is then attached to the chain of unalterable public
transactions23—hence the name “blockchain.” Some have suggested
that the immutability of the decentralized ledger makes blockchain
transactions “trustless” because bad actors can be corrected by
reference to the public ledger.24 However, large scale hacks have
shown that while distributed ledgers may be theoretically
unchangeable, blockchain systems are not incorruptible.25
See
Nolan
Bauerle,
What
is
Blockchain
Technology?,
COINDESK,
https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-blockchain-technology/ (last visited Oct. 7,
2018) (“In the case of blockchain, every node in the network is . . . updating the record
independently . . . .”).
20 Proof
of Work vs Proof of Stake: Basic Mining Guide, BLOCKGEEKS,
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/proof-of-work-vs-proof-of-stake/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
21 See Murck, supra note16(“[Y]ou don’t have to trust your counterpart to perform their
obligations or properly record transactional data, since these processes are standardized
and automated, but you do have to trust that the code and the network will function as you
expect.”).
22 See Bauerle, supra note 19 (“Authorizing transactions is a result of the entire network
applying the rules upon which it was designed (the blockchain’s protocol).”).
23 See Murck, supra note 16 (describing the process by which transactions are distributed
to independent ledgers).
24 See Aleksander Bulkin, Explaining blockchain—how proof of work enables trustless
consensus, KEEPING STOCK (May 3, 2016), https://keepingstock.net/explaining-blockchainhow-proof-of-work-enables-trustless-consensus-2abed27f0845 (“When we talk about
trustless systems, we mean that our ability to trust it does not depend on the intentions of
any party, which could be arbitrarily malicious.”).
25 See Alexandra Harney & Steve Stecklow, Twice Burned – How MT Gox’s bitcoin
customers
could
lose
again,
REUTERS
(Nov.
16,
2017,
1:15
PM),
19
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Anonymity: Some blockchains, like Bitcoin, are designed so that,
while the general public can view bitcoin transactions on a public
blockchain, the transacting parties use an encrypted pseudonym.26
Users looking at the ledger cannot identify who is trading with
whom.27 Instead, those looking at the blockchain can only see the
parties’ pseudonyms, the amounts transferred, and times of the
transactions.28 It does not take much to imagine the difficulty in
regulating a large market of unidentifiable persons, and the
anonymity facet of a blockchain poses particular difficulty for the
SEC.
Blockchain is still in its infancy. While originally developed to
create cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, coders have experimented and
created new blockchains with more complex uses.29 Ethereum, for
instance, is a blockchain currency that began in 201.30 Its internal
code promotes development of new applications, and startup
companies have developed various apps on top of Ethereum.31
Consumers can access these apps by spending their “ether,”
Ethereum’s token, to purchase other application’s ‘app tokens.’32
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/bitcoin-gox/ (“When Mt. Gox, the
world’s largest bitcoin trading exchange, collapsed in early 2014, more than 24,000
customers around the world lost access to hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of
cryptocurrency and cash.”).
26 See Iyke Aru, Blockchain Transaction Anonymity is Necessary Evil, COINTELEGRAPH
(Apr. 18, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/blockchain-transaction-anonymity-isnecessary-evil (discussing anonymity of blockchain transactions).
27 See
Zulfikar Ramzan,
Bitcoin: Overview, KHAN ACADEMY,
3:29–5:00,
https://www.khanacademy.org/economics-finance-domain/core-finance/money-andbanking/bitcoin/v/bitcoin-overview (last visited Aug. 30, 2018) (describing how users
cannot identify other traders).
28 Id.
29 See Joel Monegro, Fat Protocols, USV (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.usv.com/blog/fatprotocols (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (discussing how “early adopters, perhaps financed in
part by the profits of getting in at the start, build products and services around the protocol,
recognizing that its success would further increase the value of their tokens”).
30 Nathan Schneider, Code your own utopia: Meet Ethereum, bitcoin’s most ambitious
successor,
AL
JAZEERA
AMERICA
(April
7,
2014,
5:00
AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/4/7/code-your-ownutopiameetethereumbitcoinasmostambitioussuccessor.html .
31 Ethereum tokens are called “ether” and coders create new projects on top of the protocol
code, much like new apps for an iphone. See id. (“These tools would be able to interact with
one another and conduct transactions with a common currency called ether.”). Ethereum
raised $18 million in its own 2014 ICO. ICOs – Initial Coin Offerings – Infographic,
BLOCKCHAINHUB (July 18, 2017), https://blockchainhub.net/blog/infographics/initial-coinofferings/.
32 Also called “appcoins” or “dApps,” app tokens represent membership access or rights to
function within an application. See Will Warren, The difference between App Coins and

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

7

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 8
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

342

12/18/2018 10:47 AM

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:335

App tokens are not physical tokens at all; they are crypto-assets
that grant access to a corresponding blockchain app.33 App tokens
can be bought outright from current owners, and their price reflects
the market valuation.34
B. HOW ICOS WORK

When app developers use online publicity to sell their app tokens
and generate capital, these sales are called Initial Coin Offerings
(ICOs).35 While ICOs are still in their infancy, typical ICOs so far
have involved a blockchain tech developer who wants to fund a new
blockchain app or to support an existing app.36 To do this, the
developer promotes their project online and sells app tokens in a
scheduled offering, giving the consumer ownership or access rights
to the new application.37
It may be helpful to imagine Ethereum as a virtual fairground.
The fairground land is promising, but there isn’t much to do on
empty, open land. However, applications made on Ethereum’s
blockchain are like new rides popping up on the fairground. If you
want to enter the fairground, first you have to exchange U.S. dollars
for ether. Ether, Ethereum’s token, will act as your entry ticket, but

Protocol Tokens, 0X PROTOCOL (Feb. 1, 2017), https://blog.0xproject.com/the-differencebetween-app-coins-and-protocol-tokens-7281a428348c (noting that token sales “are being
used to drive network effects around specific applications (dApps) rather than the common
building blocks (protocols) that make applications possible”).
33 See Cryptographic Tokens, BLOCKCHAINHUB, https://blockchainhub.net/tokens/ (last
visited Oct. 7, 2018) (describing the difference between work and usage app tokens in a
blockchain protocol).
34 For the most part, app token prices are comparable to those of stocks and rely on the
classic semi-strong market efficiency assumption. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (outlining the
basic assumptions of the efficient markets theory). Whether the ‘efficient markets’
assumption is correct in this context, considering the instability of crypto-markets, is
beyond the focus of this Note.
35 Antonio Madeira, How does an ICO work, CRYPTOCOMPARE (July 30, 2018),
https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/how-does-an-ico-work/
(collecting
and
describing several notable ICOs).
36 See id. (detailing the structures and results of six ICOs, including the token
distribution).
37 See Jeff John Roberts, Why Tech Investors Love ICOs–and Lawyers Don’t, FORTUNE
(June
26,
2017)
http://fortune.com/2017/06/26/ico-initial-coin-offering-investing/
(discussing the Brave ICO, which distributed tokens to give “buyers early access to its
technology . . . [while raising] money without ceding any control to private investors or
venture capitalists”).
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most of the rides require their own tokens to ride. To get on a ride,
you have to exchange some of your ether for that ride’s app tokens.
ICOs would then be the dramatic pre-openings of blockchain app
rides on the fairground. First, the founders advertise what their
application will do and how people can get involved. 38 Then, once
the community is excited about the product, the founders sell app
tokens, using the profits to build the application that they
advertised. At the Ethereum fair, your newly purchased app tokens
can grant you access to the new ride, could give you some ownership
of the ride, or can be held as an investment and sold to other people
at the fair. If a ride becomes especially popular, like the DAO
application did before its collapse, the app tokens for that ride will
rise dramatically in price. Conversely, if the fairgoers begin to doubt
the ride’s prospects for completion or if a different ride becomes the
fair’s biggest attraction, app tokens may precipitously decline in
price.
C. THE PRE-2017 “WILD WEST”

Despite dramatic price fluctuations,39 and hype surrounding
around new apps that turned out to be speculative or fraudulent,
the regulatory presence around ICOs before 2017 was largely
nonexistent. 40 ICOs were “a Wild West with few rules, and no
policemen, where investors could bypass Wall Street’s analysts and
brokers to buy young companies that have undergone little due
diligence.”41 The investment potential and lack of regulatory
overhead provided a haven for startups without access to
conventional venture capital or that could not afford an IPO.42

Smith + Crown maintains a curated list of current and upcoming ICOs. See ICOs/Token
Sales, SMITH + CROWN, https://www.smithandcrown.com/sale/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
39 See ICO Tracker, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/ico-tracker/ (last visited Oct. 7,
2017) (tracking ICO size, number, and monthly funding).
40 See Roberts, supra note 37 (noting that in a traditional IPO a company must register
with the SEC, but in 2017 “[f]or ICOs there [we]re no such requirements yet”).
41 Lawrence Carrel, SEC Bulletin May Bring Order To Wild West ICO Market, INV’RS BUS.
DAILY (Aug. 26, 2017), http://www.investors.com/etfs-and-funds/personal-finance/secbulletin-may-bring-order-to-wild-west-ico-market/.
42 Not only are the due diligence and filing requirements for a conventional IPO expensive,
but underwriters also traditionally take a percentage of every share sold, decreasing
investment returns. Jay Ritter, Why Is Going Public So Costly, FORBES (June 19, 2014,
4:09
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayritter/2014/06/19/why-is-going-public-socostly/#1023ed864ff0.
38
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Further, ICOs were still novel, misunderstood by people
uninterested in cryptocurrencies, and not profitable enough to
garner much attention. But they quickly became too profitable to
ignore. While ICOs raised only an aggregate $300 million between
2014 and year-end 2016, they over $14 billion thus far in 2018.43
The most successful ICO in 2013, Mastercoin ICO, raised $500
thousand in bitcoin in 2013.44 Contrastingly, the DAO’s 2016 ICO
raised $150 million.45 The Waves ICO raised $16 million; the Gnosis
ICO raised $13 million; the Status ICO raised $100 million; and the
Bancor ICO raised $156 million, all in the last four years.46 The
Tezos ICO that ended in July 2017 raised $232 million.47 And most
recently, the EOS ICO raised $4.2 billion.48 By 2017, ICOs
surpassed traditional venture capital in fundraising for blockchain
ventures.49
Additionally, cryptocurrencies themselves dramatically rose in
value. At Bitcoin’s launch in 2009, one bitcoin traded for $0.0076.50
At the start of 2017, one bitcoin traded for $908.09.51 By December
2017, one bitcoin traded for over $17 thousand.52 Similarly,
Ethereum, the second most valuable cryptocurrency, grew 2,367%
in value in 2017.53 Ether traded at $8.24 on January 1, 2017.54 By

ICO Tracker, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/ico-tracker/ (last visited Oct. 27,
2018).
44 Sherman Voshmgir & Valentin Kalinov, ICOs- Initial Coin Offerings- Infographics,
BLOCKCHAINHUB (July 18, 2017), https://blockchainhub.net/blog/infographics/initial-coinofferings/.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Arjun Kharpal, Initial coin offerings have raised $1.2 billion and now surpass early stage
VC funding, CNBC.COM (Aug. 9, 2017, 7:13 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/09/initialcoin-offerings-surpass-early-stage-venture-capital-funding.html.
50 History of Bitcoin Infographic, http://historyofbitcoin.org/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
51 Bitcoin
Price
Tracker,
COINBASE,
https://www.coinbase.com/charts?locale=en;%20CoinDesk,%20Bitcoin%20Price%
20Index%20Chart,%20http://www.coindesk.com/price/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
52 Id. Bitcoin prices can fluctuate dramatically. In October 2018, bitcoin traded at
approximately $6,400. Id.
53 Arjun Kharpal, Bitcoin may have doubled this year, but rival Ethereum is up 2,000
percent.
Here’s
why,
CNBC.COM
(May
24,
2017,
7:55
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/24/ethereum-price-bitcoin-rally.html.
54 Ethereum Charts, WORLDCOININDEX, https://www.worldcoinindex.com/coin/ethereum
(last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
43
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October 6, 2017, ether traded at $3,001.55 Cryptocurrencies’
meteoric rise has been attributed to Chinese investment,56
unreliable hype and publicity,57 and general crypto-market
development.58 Regardless of the reason for the surge, these value
gains increased the capital-raising potential of ICOs.
However, because they are built on cryptocurrency base codes,
app tokens share many of the same weaknesses in security and
volatility that are inherent in cryptocurrencies.59 Stereotypes
connecting cryptocurrencies with cyber-crime and illegal trade have
been reinforced by highly publicized incidents like Ross Ulbricht’s
Silk Road trial60 and ransomware attacks.61 Further, anonymity,
decentralization, and lack of regulation all buttressed the negative
cryptocurrency bias by creating an intensely speculative ICO
environment. For example, an ICO for a token called Dogecoin was
based on a popular dog meme and was originally meant as a joke,
but it generated enough online publicity to balloon to $400 million

Id. Like bitcoin, the price of ether has also fluctuated. In October 2018, ether traded at
approximately $200. Id.
56 See Bryan Rich, Who’s Behind The Spike In Bitcoin?, FORBES (May 24, 2017, 10:11 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bryanrich/2017/05/24/whos-behind-the-spike-inbitcoin/#9c2512f47d42 (attributing increasing bitcoin demand to the fact that “Chinese
money is going into bitcoin”).
57 See Jeff John Roberts, 3 Reasons Why Bitcoin Broke $2,000, FORTUNE (May 21, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/05/21/bitcoin-2000/ (waving off the surge in bitcoin price by stating
that it “sure feels like we are in the midst of a hype cycle now”).
58 See Matthew J. Belvedere, Coinbase: Bitcoin’s spike into the stratosphere is unlikely due
to firms buying to pay cyber ransoms, CNBC.COM (May 26, 2017, 9:37 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/26/coinbase-bitcoins-spike-into-the-stratosphere-isunlikely-due-to-firms-buying-to-pay-cyber-ransoms.html.
Adam
White,
heading
Coinbase’s crypto-exchange, attributed bitcoin’s rise to “continued growth in the
fundamentals of the network.” Id..
59 See Roberts, supra note 37 (“Jeff Garzik, a leading figure in the blockchain
community who runs a consultancy called Bloq, sees ICOs as ‘transformative’ but
remains wary. ‘Ninety-nine percent of these ICOs will be garbage,’ he says. ‘It’s like
penny stocks but with less regulation.’”).
60 United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Silk Road users principally
bought and sold drugs, false identification documents, and computer hacking software.
Transactions on Silk Road exclusively used Bitcoins, an anonymous but traceable digital
currency.”)
61
Nicole Perlroth et al., Cyberattack Hits Ukraine Then Spreads Internationally, NEW
YORK TIMES (June 27, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/technology/ransomwarehackers.html; Roy Strom, Ransomware Attack on DLA Piper Puts Firms, Clients on Red
Alert,
THE
AMERICAN
LAWYER
(June
27,
2017,
4:54
PM),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202791614770/Ransomware-Attack-on-DLA-PiperPuts-Law-Firms-Clients-on-Red-Alert?slreturn=20170910154831
55
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in value.62 Regulators frequently warned investors that some ICOs
were ponzi schemes and that tokens could be illiquid.63
III. SEC INVOLVEMENT
A. THE DAO REPORT

The Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) was a tech
project built with smart contracts on the Ethereum protocol.64 The
concept was to have a decentralized venture capital fund that would
operate without any centralized leadership and fund projects that
token-holders would find attractive.65
The DAO conducted its ICO in April 2016 and raised $150 million
from 11,000 investors.66 However, within two months of the
offering’s close, a token holder manipulated an insecurity in the
DAO’s code to siphon off $50 million in ether into a private
account.67 Because 14% of all existing ether was invested in the
DAO, the $50 million loss was akin to losing around 5% of the entire
currency.68 The hack sent Ethereum’s price into a tailspin; within
hours, ether’s value dropped from $21.50 to $15 per token.69

Kevin Roose, Is There a Cryptocurrency Bubble? Just Ask Doge, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept.
15,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/15/business/cryptocurrency-bubbledoge.html.
63 See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR BULLETIN: INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS (July 25,
2017) https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investorbulletin-initial-coin-offerings (“[V]irtual tokens or coins may be susceptible to fraud,
technical glitches, hacks, or malware.”); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF INV. EDUC. &
ADVOCACY,
PONZI
SCHEMES
USING
VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES
(2017),
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ia_virtualcurrencies.pdf (“We are concerned that the
rising use of virtual currencies in the global marketplace may entice fraudsters to lure
investors into Ponzi and other schemes in which these currencies are used to facilitate
fraudulent, or simply fabricated, investments or transactions.”).
64 Antonio Madeira, The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and The Hard Fork,
CRYPTOCOMPARE, https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-the-hack-the-softfork-and-the-hard-fork/ (last updated Oct. 4, 2018).
65 Id.
66 Andrew Tar, SEC Ruling on the DAO and ICO, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH (July 27,
2017), https://cointelegraph.com/explained/sec-ruling-on-the-dao-and-ico-explained.
67 Rob Price, Digital currency Ethereum is cratering because of a $50 million hack,
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 17, 2016, 5:34 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/dao-hackedethereum-crashing-in-value-tens-of-millions-allegedly-stolen-2016-6.
68 Klint Finley, A $50 Million Hack Just Showed that the DAO is All Too Human, WIRED
(June 18, 2016, 4:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/50-million-hack-just-showeddao-human/.
69 Id.
62
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The fallout from the DAO’s collapse also caught the SEC’s
attention. On July 25, 2017, the SEC issued an investigation report
on the DAO ICO.70 The report concluded that “DAO tokens are
securities under the Securities Act of 1933 . . . and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.”71 The SEC’s DAO report was its first
declaration of jurisdiction over any ICO.
Token holders invested ether into the DAO expecting to derive
profits exclusively from the efforts of the DAO’s creators and
curators. Because they met the requirements of the Howey Test, 72
the SEC held that DAO tokens were securities and that the DAO
was subject to SEC filing requirements.73 The report further stated
that “[t]he Commission has determined not to pursue an
enforcement action in this matter,” but implied that future ICOs
should consider themselves on notice.74 Essentially, moving
forward, ICOs should expect to fall under U.S. securities law if their
tokens resemble securities.75
B. BANNING U.S. INVESTORS

The DAO Report was the first time that the SEC formally
recognized that app tokens were securities and that ICOs were
securities offerings. Industry reactions covered a spectrum.
Ethereum’s trading price, which had recovered from the DAO hack,

See DAO 21(A) REP., supra note 7.
Id. at 1.
72 The traditional test to determine whether something is an “investment contract” within
the definition of the 1933 Act, and therefore regulated as a security, is derived from SEC
v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (“[A]n investment contract for purposes of the
Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter
or a third party.”).
73 See DAO 21(A) REPORT, supra note 7, at 11–13.
74 Id. at 1.
75 The SEC’s subsequent actions have shown that they were not posing an empty threat;
since the DAO Report, the agency has filed charges against Maksim Zaslavskiy for two
unregistered fraudulent ICOs. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Exposes Two Initial Coin
Offerings Purportedly Backed by Real Estate and Diamonds, Release No. 2017-185 (Sep.
29, 2017) https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-185-0. The SEC also halted the $15
million PlexCoin ICO and filed charges against its CEO Dominic Lacroix both for fraud
and for failing to register the offering. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Emergency Action
Halts ICO Scam, Release No. 2017-219 (Dec. 4, 2017) https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-219?utm_content=bufferc34ce&utm_medium=social&utm_
source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer.
70
71
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fell 10% immediately following the report’s publication.76 Roger Ver,
a prominent bitcoin investor, denounced the SEC action as
government oppression, calling the regulators “[a] bunch of
strangers in a far off land threatening peaceful people all over the
world with violence if they don’t obey.”77
Others who had grown suspicious of fraudulent ICO activity
viewed the SEC intervention as a positive move toward legitimizing
crypto-markets. Brad Garlinghouse, CEO of Ripple, stated that
“[r]egulators aren’t going away–and shouldn’t. For generations,
they have protected people from fraud (some is happening w[ith] the
ICO market)[.]”78 But, on the whole, blockchain startups were
subject to heightened anxiety after the report, with many feeling
that “[t]he writing [was] on the wall for many recent I.C.O.s: The
S.E.C. is coming.”79
In response to the DAO report, some ICO projects sought to
exclude U.S. investors. Without U.S. persons involved, startups
reasoned that the SEC would have no jurisdiction and their ICO
would be exempt from SEC filing requirements. Monaco VISA took
this path.80 The startup, which sought to create an alternative to
conventional credit cards, conducted an ICO from May to June 2017,
but put a measure in place to prevent contributions from U.S.
persons.81 Investors looking to donate to Monaco VISA’s ICO were
uniformly directed to a click-wrap page asking: “Are you a citizen of
the United States?”82 There were two options to select from: “Y or
N.” Should the investor select ‘yes,’ they were directed to a message
stating, “sorry, your citizenship excludes you from participation in
this ICO due to excessive regulatory risk from your SEC.”83
Other ICOs have since adopted similar click-wrap U.S. resident
blocks. Moeda, an ICO that aims to help female business
Jeff John Roberts, The SEC’s Big Digital Coin Ruling: What It Means, FORTUNE (July
26, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/07/26/sec-icos/.
77 See Tar, supra note 66.
78 Id. Ripple is a cryptocurrency supported by blockchain. Our Company, RIPPLE,
https://ripple.com/company/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
79 See Roberts, supra note 71 (quoting attorney Brian Klien to the New York Times).
80 MONACO VISA, https://crypto.com//en/cards.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
81
Dana Edwards, ICOs are not for US Citizens? Should ICOs reject self proclaimed US
Citizens as a way to reduce legal and regulatory risk?, STEEMIT (May 2017),
https://steemit.com/icos/@dana-edwards/icos-are-not-for-us-citizens-should-icos-reject-selfproclaimed-us-citizens-as-a-way-to-reduce-legal-and-regulatory-risk (via archive.org).
82
Id.
83 Id.
76
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development, excluded US investors.84 As did PAquarium, an
Estonian startup intending to use ICO funding to build the world’s
largest aquarium.85 The research director of Smith + Crown, a
cryptocurrency analysis group, stated that “[m]any token sales are
barring U.S. persons from participating because of concerns around
the U.S. SEC . . .. The potential of SEC enforcement understandably
makes both the entrepreneurs wary and their off-chain backers
uncomfortable.”86
IV. ICOS AND REGULATION S COMPATIBILITY
A. THE JURISDICTION QUESTION

To protect U.S. consumers and investors, the SEC requires
companies to file and disclose financial information about securities
offerings affecting U.S. persons.87 Under the Securities Act of 1933,
however, Regulation S provides a filing safe harbor for securities
offerings “outside the United States.”88 Under this safe harbor,
American and foreign companies can offer securities to foreign
markets without filing as long as the offering does not extend to the
U.S. and there is little danger that the securities will reenter
American markets.89
By refusing to sell to U.S. investors, ICOs have created a new
issue for the SEC. The Regulation S exemption has never before
applied to crypto-assets. But because the SEC determined that the
1933 and 1934 acts apply to ICOs selling securities,90 it follows that
the exemptions in those Acts (including Regulation S) also apply to
ICOs. And while blockchain’s inherent anonymity and
decentralization complicate the application of securities law to

Andrew Ramonas, No U.S. Investors Need Apply for Some Digital Coin Offerings,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 31, 2017) https://www.bna.com/no-us-investors-n73014463997/.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, WHAT WE DO, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last
updated June 10, 2013) (“The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is
to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.”).
88 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901 (2007).
89 Id.
90 See DAO 21(A) REPORT, supra note 7, at 18 (concluding that anyone “who offer[s] and
sell[s] securities in the United States must comply with the federal securities laws,
including the requirement to register with the Commission or to qualify for an exemption”).
84

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

15

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 8
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

350

12/18/2018 10:47 AM

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:335

ICOs, the Regulation S framework can be interpreted in a way that
satisfies the exemption’s statutory intent.
It is increasingly important to determine how the foreign offering
exemption applies to ICOs. The SEC has already come up against
this issue in practice. In late 2017, the SEC filed suit against
Dominic LaCroix, a recidivist Canadian securities law violator, and
halted his company’s $15 million ICO.91 The SEC asserted that the
ICO for PlexCoin failed to file with the SEC and fraudulently
assured investors that their return on investment would be between
200% and 1,354%.92 The Eastern District of New York asserted both
subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the defendant.93
However, in January 2018, LaCroix’s lawyer revealed plans to
file a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction.94
LaCroix’s attorney asserted that “while the SEC claims many U.S.
investors bought into the PlexCoin ICO, the defendants specifically
took steps to exclude U.S. persons from the offering, noting that in
order to participate in a PlexCoin transaction, would-be purchasers
had to confirm that they were not a U.S. citizen, and were not
purchasing on behalf of a U.S. person.”95
This dispute illustrates the need to clarify the foreign offering
exemption. If LaCroix did exclude U.S. investors in such a way that
his ICO is out of the SEC’s reach, then the SEC will be forced to
dismiss the charges and un-freeze LaCroix’s assets. This could
mean that the “many U.S. investors” that LaCroix defrauded would
be without recourse.96 Alternatively, if the court asserts jurisdiction
when LaCroix genuinely believed he was conducting an exclusively
foreign offering, the result will heighten the uncertainty that ICOs
face. By clarifying the scope of the Regulation S safe harbor, this

SEC v. PlexCorps, No. 17 Civ. 7007, 2017 WL 6398722, at *2–4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017)
(granting a preliminary order and asset freeze against Dominic LaCroix and his owned
entities for likely violation of securities laws).
92 Complaint at 2, 14, SEC v. PlexCorps, No. 17 Civ. 7007 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2017) 2017
WL 5988934 (stating that there was no registration filing or exemption and that the
Plexcoin website promised returns of 200%, 332%, 629%, or 1,354% depending on when
investors purchased tokens).
93 PlexCorps, 2017 WL 6398722, at *2 (“The Court likely has subject-matter jurisdiction
over the instant action and personal jurisdiction over the Entity Defendant.”).
94 Stewart Bishop, Digital Coin Offeror Says SEC Can’t Sue in US Over $15M ICO,
LAW360 (January 9, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1000467/digital-coin-offerersays-sec-can-t-sue-in-us-over-15m-ico.
95 Id.
96 Id.
91
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Note will provide a framework that could serve to preempt needless
litigation and promote efficiency during the crypto-regulator
courtship.
B. THE REGULATION S FRAMEWORK

While its application can be cumbersome, Regulation S is not an
overly complex securities exemption. To be considered “outside the
U.S.” and satisfy the filing safe harbor under Regulation S, a
securities offering must (1) be made in an “offshore transaction,” (2)
not use “directed selling efforts” that target the U.S., and (3) comply
with the “additional conditions” imposed based on the likelihood
that securities will flow back into the U.S. market.97 All three
elements must be satisfied to fall within the safe harbor and make
an offeror exempt from filing.98
1. Offshore Transaction
Under Regulation S, an offer, sale, or resale of securities is part
of an “offshore transaction” if “[t]he offer is not made to a person in
the United States,” and if “[a]t the time the buy order is originated,
the buyer is outside the United States, or the seller and any person
acting on its behalf reasonably believe that the buyer is outside the
United States.”99 Additionally, “offers and sales of securities to
persons excluded from the definition of ‘U.S. person’ . . . shall be
deemed to be made in ‘offshore transactions.’”100
In layman’s terms, to meet the initial requirement of conducting
an “offshore transaction,” ICOs must ensure that the buyer is not
(1) located in the United States, or (2) a “U.S. person.”101 But
because cryptocurrency transactions are pseudonymous and
conducted on a distributed network, it is practically impossible to
delineate an ICO investor’s physical location.102 Therefore, the most

17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901–905 (2007).
Id. at § 230.903(a) (requiring all three elements to classify an offer or sale of securities
as occurring outside the United States).
99 Id. at § 230.902(h)(1) (emphasis added). See also § 230.902(k)(1) (defining “U.S. person”
to include “natural person resident[s],” trusts, and other entities created by natural person
residents or for their benefit).
100 Id. at § 230.902(h)(3).
101 Id. at § 230.902(h)(1).
102 See supra Part I.A (describing decentralization and anonymity as primary features of a
blockchain).
97
98
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workable method to ensure an offshore transaction is to exclude all
“U.S. persons” from the ICO.
Offerors do not need to ensure with absolute certainty that
investors are not American to exclude U.S. persons. Instead, the
SEC applies a deferential standard. When promulgating Regulation
S, “the Commission noted that sellers should determine the
reasonable steps necessary to confirm the offshore location of the
buyer and the non-U.S. person status of the beneficial holder.”103 By
not mandating specific practices to prove an absence of U.S.
investment, the SEC ensured that “‘[t]he offshore transaction
requirement would thus impose a positive obligation on sellers and
their agents to ensure (by whatever means they consider
satisfactory)’” that the buyer was not a U.S. person.104
Following the SEC’s reasoning, to conduct an “offshore
transaction,” ICOs are only required to take measures that they find
appropriate and make a good faith effort to exclude U.S. persons.
While there may be multiple ways to meet this standard, the most
obvious way to satisfy the “offshore transaction” element is to use a
conspicuous click-wrap notice.105 Basically, ICOs need a pop-up
screen that requires investors to verify that their ICO contributions
are not made on behalf of a “U.S. person.”
For example, a startup called Atlant launched an ICO in
September 2017.106 When eager investors tried to purchase app
tokens from the Atlant ICO website, a click-wrap notification
popped up:
“I confirm hereby that I am not U.S. citizen/permanent
resident/representing
U.S.
company
or
citizen/permanent resident/representing company of

SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RESPONSE LETTER: ON-MARKET BOOKBUILDS PTY LTD (2014),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2014/on-market-bookbuilds-reg-s111314.htm (emphasis added).
104 Id. (citing Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6779, 53 Fed. Reg.
22661 (June 17, 1988)) (emphasis in original).
105 Additionally, the SEC has since clarified that issuers may use “electronic procedures”
to obtain “certifications and agreements” from investors. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
COMPLIANCE AND DISCLOSURE INTERPRETATIONS, SECTION 277: RULE 903, 277.05 (Nov. 6,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrulesinterps.htm#277.05.
106 ATLANT
announces Successful Initial Coin Offering (ICO), ATLANT BLOG,
https://blog.atlant.io/antlant-announces-successful-initial-coin-offering-ico-85cee4b69b82
(Nov. 7, 2017) (announcing the completion of the Atlant ICO on October 31, 2017).
103
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any jurisdiction where purchase of ATL tokens is
illegal, restricted or requires special accreditation.”107
To invest cryptocurrency in Atlant and receive app tokens,
investors had to certify that they were not a U.S. citizen or entity.108
And while it may be unartfully drafted, the click-wrap language
does preclude U.S. persons from contributing without notice.109
Because Atlant decided that click-wrap was a reasonable measure
to exclude U.S. persons, Atlant would satisfy the deferential first
prong of Regulation S.
However, it is worth noting that a click-wrap notification like
Atlant’s is likely the lowest standard of notification that the SEC
will consider a good faith means to exclude U.S. investors. While an
issuer may select the means of exclusion that they “consider
satisfactory,” there are limits to that discretion.110 For instance, the
SEC’s guidance explicitly states that “if the disclaimer [barring U.S.
persons] is not on the same screen as the offering material, or is not
on a screen that must be viewed before a person can view the
offering materials, it would not be meaningful.”111
An interested investor in the above-described “browse-wrap”
situation could navigate to an ICO’s website and invest without ever
seeing or being aware that terms and conditions exist that might
prohibit U.S. investment. Also, because the terms are not
prominently featured in a browse-wrap scenario, investors may
assume that any existing terms are boilerplate and that such terms
would not preclude their contribution.112 For these reasons,
Screenshot of Atlant ICO Website, https://atlant.io/?utm_source=runcpa&
utm_medium=banner&utm_campaign=ICOStarted&track_id=212350129 (last visited Jan
13, 2018) (screenshot on file with author).
108 Id.
109 This tactic is similar to the one that Dominic LaCroix claims to have used, supra note
92, and Monaco Visa did use, supra note 82. But keep in mind that click-wrap notice only
serves to satisfy the “offshore transaction” prong of Regulation S.
110 See supra note 105 at 277.04 (stating that the “‘safe harbor protection would not be
available where offers and sales were made nominally to non-U.S. persons to evade the
restrictions.’” (citing Securities Act Release No. 6863 (April 24, 1990)).
111 Statement Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites To Offer Securities, Release No. 337516,
63
Fed.
Reg.
14,806,
at
14,808,
n.21
(March
23,
1998)
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-7516.htm#foot21; see also id. (“Because of the global
reach of the Internet, a disclaimer that simply states, ‘The offer is not being made in any
jurisdiction in which the offer would or could be illegal,’ however, would not be
meaningful”).
112 For similar reasons, browse-wrap conditions have long been invalidated in contract law
for not providing consumers with constructive notice. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble,
107
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anything less than a clear and conspicuous click-wrap notification
should be deemed insufficient to put U.S. persons on notice that
they are excluded from an ICO.
On the other hand, this baseline requirement does not preclude
ICOs from taking further precautions beyond click-wrap notice. The
Datum ICO (seeking to create a data commodities market)113 and
Mercury Protocol ICO (an Ethereum-based communication
platform)114 required investing parties to register and undergo
third-party due diligence with Whitelist115 to ensure that investors
were not U.S. persons. Likewise, the EOS ICO website116 employed
click-wrap notification and automatically excluded U.S. IP
addresses from contributing.117 These additional measures are more
burdensome than the click-wrap requirement but are certainly
recommendable as extra precautions.
Lastly, despite an offeror’s best efforts, the SEC recognizes that
“U.S. persons may respond falsely to residence questions, disguise
their country of residence by using non-resident addresses, or use
other devices, such as offshore nominees, in order to participate in
offshore offerings of securities or investment services,” even in the
face of reasonable safeguards.118 But an ICO offeror is not liable for
fraud perpetrated by investors. Instead, an ICO must only show
that it took “reasonable steps” to ensure that U.S. persons were

Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014) (invalidating an arbitration mandate in online
terms-of-use where “a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink
on every page of the website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them
to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent”); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns
Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2nd Cir. 2002) (holding that “a reference to the existence of license
terms on a submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive
notice of those terms”).
113 DATUM, https://gettingstarted.datum.org/docs/introduction/html (last visited Oct. 7,
2018) (“Datum provides . . . access to a data marketplace to monetize your data.”).
114 MERCURY PROTOCOL, https://www.mercuryprotocol.com/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2018)
(“Our technology, products and vision aim to bring people together in a trusted way to build
relationships, conduct commerce, and thrive online.”).
115 ICO WHITELIST, https://www.icowhitelist.com/about (last visited Aug. 30, 2018) (“By
analyzing deals and conducting due diligence ICO Whitelist uncovers deals at an early
stage.”).
116 EOS is an ICO-funded project similar to Ethereum that seeks to develop “an operating
system-like construct upon which applications can be built.” EOS, Frequently Asked
Questions, https://eos.io/faq (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
117 Screenshot of EOS, https://eos.io/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2017) (on file with author).
118 See supra note 111, at 14,808.
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excluded to meet the “offshore transaction” requirement.119 In the
near-anonymous cryptocurrency environment, a click-wrap
notification is reasonable for meeting that requirement under
Regulation S.
2. Directed Selling Efforts
Foreign offering issuers seeking safe harbor from SEC filing
must also refrain from “directed selling efforts.”120 Assuming that
an ICO fulfills the “offshore transaction” notice requirements, it will
satisfy the no “directed selling efforts” requirement if the ICO
abstains from marketing in any media that specifically targets U.S.
audiences. Under Regulation S, “[d]irected selling efforts” are
defined as “any activity undertaken for the purpose of, or that could
reasonably be expected to have the effect of, conditioning the market
in the United States for any of the securities being offered in
reliance on this Regulation S.”121
Overall, the SEC’s practical focus when identifying “directed
selling efforts” has been to weed out activity that has “the effect of .
. . conditioning the [United States] market.”122 For instance, the
regulation submits that an ad in a publication with “an average
circulation in the United States of 15,000 or more copies per issue”
is an example of market conditioning that the SEC would deem
“directed selling efforts.”123
But in the era of internet marketing, ICOs have no need to
advertise in print media. Instead, social media enables blockchain
entrepreneurs to bypass traditional marketing means and spread
excitement about their ICOs online.124 In the absence of any
accredited rating service, cryptocurrency investors turn toward

Id. at 14,808–09 (“[I]f a U.S. person purchases securities or investment services
notwithstanding adequate procedures reasonably designed to prevent the purchase, we
would not view the Internet offer after the fact as having been targeted at the United
States, absent indications that would put the issuer on notice that the purchaser was a
U.S. person.”).
120 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a)(2) (2007).
121 Id. at § 230.902(c).
122 Id. at § 230.902(c)(1).
123 Id. at § 230.902(c)(2)(i).
124 SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR ALERT: SOCIAL MEDIA AND INVESTING- AVOIDING
FRAUD, 3 (Jan. 2012), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/socialmediaandfraud.pdf
(highlighting the dangers of fraud through the internet and stating that “[p]ump-and-dump
schemes often occur on the Internet where it is common to see messages posted that urge
readers to buy a stock quickly or to sell before the price goes down . . .”).
119
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social media outlets like Twitter125 and Reddit126 to discuss ICOs
and discern good investments from empty schemes.
Fortunately, the SEC has published guidance on internet
advertisement.127 In most cases under Regulation S, the SEC
“generally would not consider an offshore Internet offer made by a
non-U.S. offeror as targeted at the United States .”128 However, each
case will receive an independent analysis and prudent issuers
should ensure that (1) “[t]he Web site includes a prominent
disclaimer” that U.S. investors are prohibited, and (2) “[t]he Web
site offeror implements procedures that are reasonably designed to
guard against sales to U.S. persons in the offshore offering.”129
Taken as a whole, the SEC’s internet guidance suggests that
foreign ICOs can generally advertise on third-party cites like Reddit
or Instagram as long as their offering portal includes the click-wrap
disclaimer required under the “offshore transaction” prong.130
Additionally, offerors are normally given some leeway because the
internet pervades modern culture. For instance, the SEC guidance
offers as an example: “the fact that an Internet offeror posts offering
materials in English even though it is based in a non-English
speaking country will not, by itself, demonstrate that the offer is
targeted at the United States.”131
However, one growing trend that the SEC will deem “direct
selling efforts” is the recruitment of U.S.-based celebrities to
promote ICOs. In 2017 alone, celebrities like DJ Khaled, Floyd
Mayweather, and Paris Hilton all promoted ICO launches on their
Laura Shin, ICO Communities Look Past Regulations and Attempt to Evaluate Tokens
and
Set
Standards,
FORBES
(Aug.
11,
2017,
8:03
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/08/11/ico-communities-look-past-regulationsand-attempt-to-evaluate-tokens-and-set-standards/ (“One band of crypto insiders formed
via Twitter has begun a series of salons on token ethics for issuers.”)
126 A vibrant cryptocurrency community has developed on Reddit. See, e.g., r/bitcoin,
REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2018) (a reddit forum
focused on Bitcoin); r/cryptocurrency, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/
(last visited Aug. 30, 2018) (discussing cryptocurrency); r/ethereum, REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2018) (discussing Ethereum and
ICOs).
127 See supra note 111, at 14,806.
128 Id. at 14,808.
129 Id.
130 See supra Part III.B.1. To be sure, the “directed selling efforts” prong requires the same
click-wrap notification backstops that are already required by the previous prong. But the
doctrinal overlap of reinforcing investor notice actually promotes the SEC’s disclosure
mission and creates no additional burdens on ICO offerors.
131 See supra note 111, at 14,808 n.22.
125
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Instagram accounts.132 Cobinhood, a blockchain project promising a
“zero trading fee cryptocurrency exchange,”133 recruited
actor/musician Jamie Foxx to promote their ICO.134 And since all of
these celebrities are primarily popular in the United States, their
endorsements would reasonably and (perhaps) purposefully “have
the effect of . . . conditioning the [United States] market” and thus
generate U.S. excitement around the ICOs.135
The SEC has since openly criticized and warned about such
endorsements. The agency published a statement insisting that
“[a]ny celebrity or other individual who promotes a virtual token or
coin that is a security must disclose the nature, scope, and amount
of compensation received in exchange for the promotion.”136
Further, the SEC held that celebrities “making these endorsements
may also be liable for potential violations of the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws, for participating in an
unregistered offer and sale of securities, and for acting as
unregistered brokers.”137 Essentially, the SEC will not tolerate
unregistered ICOs using U.S. celebrity endorsements.
But as long as ICOs meet the requirements necessary to satisfy
an “offshore transaction”138 and avoid advertisements specifically
targeted toward American consumers (like paying for social media
endorsements from U.S. celebrities), they should satisfy the “no
directed selling efforts” analysis of the Regulation S safe harbor.
3. Flowback and Additional Conditions
Because protecting U.S. investors is its primary mission, the SEC
promulgated Regulation S to further the policy that the SEC should

Rachel O’Leary, DJ Khaled Is the Latest Celebrity to Promote an ICO, COINDESK (Sept.
29, 2017, 12:45 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/dj-khaled-is-the-latest-celebrity-topromote-an-ico/.
133 COBINHOOD, https://cobinhood.com/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
134 Eugene Kim, Cryptocurrency investors worry about a bubble as Jamie Foxx and other
celebrities
jump
on
board,
CNBC
(Sept.
19,
2017,
2:28
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/19/jamie-foxx-ico-investors-worried.html.
135 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(c)(1) (2007).
136 SEC STATEMENT URGING CAUTION AROUND CELEBRITY BACKED ICOS (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-potentially-unlawful-promotionicos .
137 Id.
138 See supra Part III.B.1.
132
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not regulate offerings that do not affect U.S. markets.139 But even
when foreign securities are initially offered only to non-U.S.
persons, there is still no guarantee that those securities will not
reenter the U.S. after their initial sale either through secondary
markets or personal transfer.140 To address dangers stemming from
unregistered securities entering the U.S. from abroad and affecting
home markets (a phenomenon known “flowback”), Regulation S
imposes additional conditions on issuers whose unregistered
securities are likely to reenter U.S. markets.141
i. Flowback Categories
Under Regulation S, foreign offerings are traditionally
categorized into either Category 1, Category 2, or Category 3, based
on the projected likelihood that the unregistered securities will
reenter the United States.142 Securities presenting the least danger
of flowback fall into Category 1 and need only meet the “offshore
transaction” and “no directed selling efforts” obligations.143
Securities presenting intermediate danger of flowback are
Category 2 offerings and must satisfy both the Category 1
requirements and meet “additional conditions.”144 Chief among
these conditions, a Category 2 offeror must (1) mark their securities
as “restricted” from U.S. purchase and (2) impose a “40-day
distribution compliance period” during which issuers and
purchasers are barred from selling the securities to U.S. persons or
entities.145

SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, OFFSHORE OFFERS AND SALES, RELEASE NO. 122, at 1, 5 (1990)
(“The Commission, however, historically has recognized that registration of offerings with
only incidental jurisdictional contacts should not be required.”).
140 Clinton Culpepper, Establishing an Executive Agreement to Permit Regulation S
Securities and Avoid the Fraudulent Activities Associated with their Secondary Transfer,
31 REV. LITIG. 661, 674–75 (2012) (“Because the unregulated securities can be sold at the
market price of the registered securities, the companies make a profit on the difference
between the prices of the unregistered Regulation S securities and registered domestic
securities that are trading in U.S. financial markets.”).
141 See OFFSHORE OFFERS AND SALES, RELEASE NO. 122, supra note 139, at 12 (“The criteria
used to divide securities into three groups, such as nationality and reporting status of the
issuer and the degree of U.S. market interest in the issuer's securities, were chosen because
they reflect the likelihood of flowback into the United States and the degree of information
available to U.S. investors regarding such securities.”).
142 See id. at 4.
143 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a)–(b)(1) (2007).
144 Id. at § 230.903(a)-(b)(2).
145 Id at § 230.903(b)(2).
139
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Finally, unregistered offerings that present the greatest
likelihood of flowback receive Category 3 additional conditions.146
Category 3 offerors must satisfy the restrictions placed on Category
1 and 2 offerings and must ensure that their securities are subject
to a year-long “distribution compliance period”—a longer wait than
Category 2’s forty days.147 Additionally, Category 3 offerors must
affirmatively certify that any security purchaser is a non-U.S.
person, and that any subsequent sales during the “distribution
compliance period” (even those secondary sales not from the issuer)
contain a notice that the securities must not be sold to a U.S.
person.148
ii. Substantial U.S. Market Interest
To determine the likelihood of flowback for the purpose of
assigning Category 1, 2, or 3 burdens, the SEC looks to whether
there is a “substantial U.S. market interest” in the foreign
securities.149 Traditionally, the SEC has used “securities exchanges
and inter-dealer quotation systems” or has analyzed where the
majority of an offeror’s outstanding debt securities have settled to
discern whether the U.S. market interest is substantial.150 Based on
the agency’s findings under those metrics, an offering would have to
meet requirements under the corresponding category.151
However, there is no translatable inter-dealer system in the
blockchain market to help discern a national market interest for
ICOs. Because ICOs use anonymous globalized cryptocurrencies
and there are no nationally-based authoritative quotation systems,
there is currently no workable metric by which we might assign an
ICO a specific score of U.S. interest, or even determine if purchasers
are American.152 The most comparable metric would be to rely on
the internet traffic found on Reddit, Twitter, and other sites.
However, that standard would be arbitrary and unreliable.

See id. at § 230.903(b)(3) (imposing the greatest number of conditions on offerings).
Id. at § 230.903(a), (b)(3).
148 Id.
149 Id at § 230.903(b)(1)(i)(A).
150 Id. at § 230.902(j).
151 Id. at § 230.903(a)–(b)(1).
152 Timothy Lee, How Private Are Bitcoin Transactions?, FORBES (Jul. 14, 2011, 9:31 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2011/07/14/how-private-are-bitcoin-transactions/
(“[Bitcoin] hasn't built the kind of surveillance infrastructure the government has for
tracking dollar-denominated transactions.”)
146
147
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C. CATEGORY 3 ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS SHOULD APPLY TO ICOS

Since the metric traditionally used to ascertain the “U.S. market
interest” and categorize Regulation S offerings cannot be feasibly
applied to ICOs, the SEC should err on the side of caution and
interpret Regulation S to impose the Category 3 conditions to all
unregistered ICOs.153 Considering the SEC’s demonstrated interest
in protecting U.S. investors from exposure to dangerous
investments without adequate disclosures, there is significant need
for the SEC to approach ICO fundraising with caution.154 Should the
SEC be overly deferential to blockchain startups using ICOs, there
is greater likelihood that both pervasive fraud and inadequate
diligence155 will harm American investors.
1. Alternative Classifications are Insufficient
Because there is no workable metric to determine U.S. market
interest and categorize ICO projects, the SEC must forgo meritbased classification until a suitable system develops. Until such
time, the SEC has four distinct options: (1) assert that ICOs cannot
rely on Regulation S at all and must file under Section 5 if they are
offering security tokens to U.S. investors; (2) apply the most
deferential Category 1 restrictions to all ICOs in the absence of
affirmative proof of market interest; (3) apply the mid-level
Category 2 additional conditions to all ICOs; or (4) apply the most
stringent Category 3 additional conditions to all ICOs in the absence
of evidence that there is no U.S. market interest.
The first option is undesirable because not allowing ICOs to use
Regulation S is contrary to SEC policy.156 Requiring all ICOs to
register would rope in foreign ICOs who are issuing securities solely
in limited foreign markets. The SEC does not wish to exert global

Those categories appear at 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3) (2007).
The SEC has already begun enforcement actions against Maksim Zaslavskiy for
launching two entirely fraudulent ICOs that raised around $300,000. See Release No.
2017–185, supra note 75.
155 For example, Tezos completed its 2017 ICO without any SEC filing. See infra note 162.
It has since devolved into an internal power struggle, leaving investors with near-worthless
tokens and without any of the promised network benefits. See Paul Vigna, Tezos Raised
$232 Million in a Hot Coin Offering, Then a Fight Broke Out, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2017,
12:07 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tezos-raised-232-million-in-a-hot-coin-offeringthen-a-fight-broke-out-1508354704 (describing the Tezos founders’ power struggle).
156 See supra note 139.
153
154
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jurisdiction on all securities offerings.157 Such an interpretation
would directly contradict the SEC’s limited jurisdictional reach and
violate the “longstanding principle of American law that legislation
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”158
In contrast, applying Category 1 additional conditions to
unregistered ICOs would be under-inclusive. Though the SEC is
deferential in the application of the “offshore transactions”
requirement, “additional conditions” are protections added to
protect against securities that present a heightened risk of
flowback.159 Just because the SEC cannot gauge the public interest
in a specific security does not mean that flowback does not present
a danger to U.S. investors.
Finally, applying Category 2 additional conditions would be an
unprincipled middle-ground measure that would neither satisfy
blockchain entrepreneurs nor substantially protect U.S. markets
from restricted securities. Companies launching ICOs would still
need to label their securities as restricted, but the label would expire
after a mere forty days.160 Those restrictions are insufficient. Tezos,
for instance, finished its ICO in July of 2017, but as of October the
development team expressed doubts that the network could launch
before February 2018.161 If Category 2 conditions applied, U.S.
persons could have unwittingly traded unregistered Tezos tokens
for five months after the forty-day period before the promised
network was even active. Allowing unregistered tokens (like Tezos)
to enter the U.S. market without disclosure after only forty days
exposes investors to the speculative trading volatility that still
exists well after that period.162 A one-year holding period may not
Id.
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (citing EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)) (internal quotations omitted).
159 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3) (2007).
160 See id. at § 230.903(b)(2)(ii).
161 See Josiah Wilmoth, Tezos Derivatives Crashes Amid Management Infighting after $232
Million ICO, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (Oct. 20, 2017, 8:25 PM), https://www.ccn.com/tezosderivatives-crash-amid-management-infighting-and-stalled-development/ (describing the
delayed launch date).
162 Tezos now faces litigation and regulatory risk for securities violations, highlighting the
dangers ICOs face. See Jon Buck, Tezos ICO Class Action Lawsuit in Works as Value
Tumbles, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 21, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/tezos-ico-classaction-lawsuit-in-works-as-value-tumbles (noting that a San Diego-based law firm
asserted that Tezos founders “have violated U.S. securities laws in conducting the ICO . . .
[h]ere, it is clear that the tokens were never registered.”).
157
158
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entirely quash speculation, but it would better attract investors that
actually believed in the young company and ensure that investors
are not solely participating to engage in pump-and-dump behavior.
1. Text, Policy, and Intent All Support Category 3 Conditions
The language in Regulation S supports the application of
Category 3’s “additional conditions” to ICOs. Category 3 applies “to
securities that are not eligible for Category 1 or 2[.]”163 Category 1
only applies when “[t]here is no substantial U.S. market
interest,”164 and Category 2 is generally reserved for reporting
issuers and foreign debt offerings.165 Because there is no way to
divine an ICO’s market interest for purposes of Category 1, and ICO
companies are mostly unreported and are not debt offerings under
Category 2, the default language of Category 3 should control.
Further, applying Category 3 “additional conditions” to ICOs is
necessary to serve the policy animating Regulation S. Since its
promulgation, the SEC has consistently maintained that the
Regulation S exemption “does not apply to transactions that, though
in technical compliance, are designed to evade the registration
requirement.”166 Already, ICOs conducted under the guise of
excluding U.S. persons are trading freely on secondary exchanges
without any restrictions on U.S. purchases.167
Demonstrating the danger of secondary markets, EOS (the ICO
previously mentioned for using IP detection to exclude American
investors) is already openly trading on secondary markets like
Kraken and Bitfinex, which are available to both U.S. and foreign

17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3) (2007).
Id. at § 230.903(b)(1)(i)(A).
165 See id. at § 230.903(b)(2) (“Category 2. The following conditions apply to securities that
are not eligible for Category 1 . . . of this section and that are equity securities of a reporting
foreign issuer, or debt securities of a reporting issuer or of a non-reporting foreign issuer.”).
166 Geiger v. SEC, 363 F.3d 481, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Offshore Offers and
Sales, Release No. 6863, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306 (May 2, 1990));see also SEC v. Luna, No. 2:10–
CV–2166–PMP–CWH, 2014 WL 794202 (D. Nev. Feb. 26, 2014); SEC v. Boock, No. 09 Civ.
8261(DLC), 2011 WL 3792819 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011).
167 A San Francisco-based secondary market called Kraken allows global users to exchange
“Bitcoin(XBT), Ethereum (ETH), Bitcoin Cash (BCH), Monero (XMR), Dash
(DASH), Litecoin (LTC), Ripple (XRP), Stellar/Lumens (XLM), Ethereum Classic
(ETC), Augur REP tokens (REP), ICONOMI (ICN), Melon (MLN), Zcash (ZEC),
Dogecoin (XDG), Tether (USDT), Gnosis (GNO), and EOS (EOS).” Frequently
Asked Questions, K RAKEN , https://www.kraken.com/help/faq (last visited Dec. 26,
2017).
163
164
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persons.168 While the EOS group disclaims any involvement with
secondary trading, they concede that “it is possible that EOS tokens
could be transferred on a peer-to-peer basis or on platforms operated
by 3rd parties.”169
So, while EOS knows that secondary markets trade its
unregistered tokens to U.S. persons, EOS has no reason to care. As
it currently stands, U.S. persons can visit a U.S.-based exchange
and purchase unregistered crypto-tokens without receiving any
disclosure or notice that the tokens are unregistered. Additionally,
the rising cryptocurrency prices and public awareness170 will likely
only drive more eager U.S. investors into these fluid, anonymous
markets.
The SEC can actively disincentivize the EOS group’s apathy by
applying Category 3 additional conditions. If Category 3 conditions
were in place, EOS tokens would be subject to a one year
“distribution compliance period” wherein the issuer must certify
that any purchasers are non-U.S. persons.171 Additionally, EOS
tokens would need an attached disclaimer172 that contractually
obligates any subsequent purchasers and sellers to refuse sale to
any U.S. persons during the one-year period.173 If these conditions
were in place, they would better protect the market from illiquid
tokens and guarantee that U.S. investors at least receive notice

See
Kraken
Launches
EOS
Trading,
KRAKEN
(July
1,
2017),
https://blog.kraken.com/post/1112/kraken-launches-eos-trading/ (“Kraken is pleased to
announce support for EOS trading!”); BITFINEX WEBSITE, https://www.bitfinex.com/
(trading EOS as of Dec. 26, 2017).
169 Frequently Asked Questions, EOS, https://eos.io/faq (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
170 See supra Part I.C (discussing how cryptocurrencies dramatically rose in value).
171 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3) (2007) (“The purchaser of the securities (other than a
distributer) certifies that it is not a U.S. person and is not acquiring the securities for the
account or benefit of any U.S. person . . . .”).
172 This ledger need not be a physical agreement, and in fact could be ingrained in the
crypto token itself. EOS actually boasts as a feature that within each token that “enables
blockchains to establish a peer-to-peer terms of service agreement or a binding contract
among those users who sign it, referred to as a ‘constitution.’” EOS.IO Technical White
Paper v2, GITHUB (Mar. 16, 2018), https://github.com/EOSIO/Documentation/
blob/master/TechnicalWhitePaper.md#constitution.
173 17 § 230.903(b)(3) (2007). It should be noted that the “restricted security” requirement,
while conventionally applied only to domestic issuers in a foreign offering, could also be
applied to foreign issuers of crypto-tokens. Applying the “restricted security” requirement
to foreign issuers would further protect investors from ICO risks and would not harm the
statutory interpretation of Regulation S.
168
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before purchasing unregistered tokens during the one-year
period.174
And finally, Regulation S’s legislative history supports the
application of Category 3’s “additional conditions.” One of the
primary concerns that the SEC had with the initial version of
Regulation S was that “[a]lthough the regulation ha[d] proved
successful for many types of offerings […] Regulation S [was] used
as a means of perpetrating fraudulent and manipulative
schemes.”175 In 1998, responding to concerns stoked by microcap
securities, the SEC took steps to strengthen Regulation S’s
restrictions and extended the “distribution compliance period” to
one year for domestic issuers.176
The SEC has never loosened restrictions applied by Regulation
S, and the 1998 move toward tightening restrictions demonstrates
that the Commission’s attitude errs on the side of adding additional
precautions. If the SEC were to apply less than Category 3
“additional conditions,” the move would directly contradict the
protectionist purposes that motivated the 1998 revision and would
weaken Regulation S’s application.
V. CONCLUSION
Initial Coin Offerings present a new way for tech companies to
garner fast capital investment. And for a couple of years, they
operated without any regulatory oversight. But those days are now
over. The SEC’s DAO report and subsequent enforcement actions
signal an end to the wild-west ICO days. By stepping into the
crypto-environment, the SEC demonstrated that it will apply the
1933 and 1934 Security Acts to ICOs that it deems to be selling
securities. Moving forward, foreign ICOs seeking an exemption from
SEC filing by excluding U.S. investors should be on notice that they
will need to turn to Regulation S.

See Use of Internet Web Sites To Offer Securities, supra note 111 (“In our view, if a U.S.
person purchases securities or investment services notwithstanding adequate procedures
reasonably designed to prevent the purchase, we would not view the Internet offer after
the fact as having been targeted at the United States, absent indications that would put
the issuer on notice that the purchaser was a U.S. person.”).
175 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL RULE: OFFSHORE OFFERS AND SALES
(REGULATION S) (Feb. 18, 1998), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7505.htm#body14.
176 See id. (“The distribution compliance period for these securities will be lengthened from
40 days to one year . . . .”).
174
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For an ICO to comply with Regulation S and be exempt from
securities registration, the ICO must first ensure it has met the
“offshore transaction” requirement by (at least) installing a clickwrap U.S. exclusion notice. Next, the project must refrain from any
“directed selling efforts”—efforts that target U.S. investors. While
general internet advertisements will not count as targeted
advertising, enlisting U.S.-based celebrity endorsements likely will
count.
Lastly, since the “substantial U.S. market interest” test does not
translate to the crypo-market context, deciding which “additional
conditions” ICOs should meet under Regulation S is the most
burdensome statutory adjustment. However, the text, the sound
policy of protecting U.S. investors from risk, and Regulation S’s
history all support utilizing the Category 3 “additional conditions.”
Regulation S provides a flexible and appropriate structure
whereby issuers can ensure compliance and avoid securities filing.
Simultaneously, under Regulation S, regulators can protect U.S.
investors from potentially disastrous risk. At some point, Initial
Coin Offerings and blockchain may evolve to the point where a new
regulatory doctrine is required to properly serve the SEC’s charge.
But as ICOs stand today, the existing Regulation S framework is
authoritative, workable, and adaptable. This Note suggests the
optimal interpretive scheme to apply that framework and tame the
crypto-wild west.
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